SIMPLICITY AS A SECURITY PRINCIPLE

20th DOE CSG Meeting 28 April 1998 Lara H. Baker & David J. Bailey

15:02 4/24/98

TOPICS

- Background
- Rationale
- Examples
- Conclusions
- Recommendations

BACKGROUND

- "Of two possible solutions, try the simpler first"
 - Paraphrase of William of Occam. Often called "Occam's Razor".
- "Everything should be as simple as possible -- but no simpler"
 - Albert Einstein

BACKGROUND

- "Complexity is troubling; hidden complexity is dangerous"
 - Many sources
- "What you don't know CAN hurt you"
 - All flight instructors
- "Keep It Simple, Stupid"
 - All Sergeants

WHY COMPLEXITY

- Creeping Feature-itis
- "Since you're doing that anyway, why don't you . . ."
- "The computer can do it, so why don't we do it?"
- It seems easier to sell -- i.e., "More bang for the buck"

COMPETING IDEAS

"Trusted Systems"

- » Build a complex system that meets a complex set of rules, and prove that the rules and the implementation are correct.
- Sequestered Servers
 - Build a simple system that does a useful task, and prove it complete -- i.e., use an exhausting search to prove that it does nothing unexpected.

SYNERGISTIC IDEAS

- Simplicity
- Layering
 - » Simplification of interfaces

SEQUESTERED SERVERS

- One machine -- one function
 - » Hardware is free
- Separate Configuration and Operations
- Limit Interface(s) -- e.g., use NIU's
- Limit Operator Actions
- Exhaustively Test

SEQUESTERED SERVERS

- Consider Layering Machines -- i.e., Use
 2 or More Machines in Series
- Layered Internal Protections
 - » No Extraneous Daemons Running
 - No Un-needed Software on System, Including Utilities
 - » Use Firewall Rules to Preclude Connections
 - » Immutable Files

Galaxy Computer Services, Inc.

SIMPLE can equal MORE ROBUST

- Attacking a large, complex software system
 - » e.g., sendmail
- Attacking the interfaces among software systems.
 - » Time-of-check vs. time-of-use
- Cracking LTSS
 - » "Is that all there is?"

EXPERIENCE

An alert, aware user community is the best defense you'll ever have.

APPLY SIMPLICITY

- System Design
- Implementation
- Verification and Accreditation
- Operation

Reality Check

 "For every problem, there is a solution that is simple, obvious, and wrong."
 Murphy's Laws, many sources

LARA'S LAW OF LEAST LIARS

- In any situation with differing accounts from different sources, consider the smallest number of accounts one must ignore for all the rest of the accounts to be consistent.
- 1? 2? 3? 4+ No


DESIGN

- IV&V of design for moving data from Secret to Unclassified.
- Secure Xenix and Secure Oracle
- MLS
- Replacing Sneakernet
- Data Volume and Required Rate
- Simple Solution


IMPLEMENTATION


- LLNL Automatic Alignment System
- Simplification by Definition
- Bottom Line -- Changing a Multi-Level System is expensive and difficult. Avoid changes if possible; if changes are unavoidable, localize the changes as much as possible.

Automatic Alignment Computer




Automatic Alignment Computer










AFTAC PROBLEM


- Large, world-wide seismic data collection system -- Unclassified
- Large, localized data analysis system --Secret
- Automated, near-real-time transfer of data from the field to the analysis system -- ONE-WAY TRANSFER.


DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS

- Source -- DOE Experience
- Any Machine That Runs User Code is
 MALICIOUS -- Accidents & Insiders
- Malicious Insiders DO Exist
- Machines Do Break
- Complexity is Troubling
- Hidden Complexity is Dangerous



15:02 4/24/98





SYSTEM SECURITY POLICIES

Most Systems

- "That Which Is Not Expressly Forbidden, Is Permitted."
- Most "Firewalls"
 - "That Which Is Not Expressly Permitted Is Forbidden."

THE DIODE's POLICY GOAL

"That Which Is Not Expressly Permitted Is Impossible."

OPERATIONS

- In general, Operators can/will make mistakes.
- Operators can't make mistakes if they can't do anything except what you let them do.
- Operator's shell is /bin/false

CONCLUSIONS

- Security and Complexity are antagonistic
- Simplicity pays many dividends
 - » Evaluation, Certification, and Accreditation are much easier.
 - » Fewer Operational Surprises
 - » Easier to explain to management
- Simplicity works better!

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Keeping It Simple is Smart
- Concentrate the "Multi-levelness" within as small a perimeter as feasible, then LEAVE THE SYSTEM ALONE.
- Don't trust user machines
- Consider using Sequestered Servers

SIMPLICITY AS A SECURITY PRINCIPLE

20th DOE CSG Meeting Lara H. Baker & David J. Bailey lara@gcsi.com, daveb@gcsi.com