NISSC Panel on Vulnerabilities Data: The UC Davis VUlnerabilities Project

Classifying Vulnerabilities

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Where We're Going

- Develop a scheme to classify vulnerabilities
  - Refer to any such scheme as a VCS (**V**ulnerabilities **C**lassification **S**cheme)

To get there:

- Need an agreed-upon vocabulary
- Need some method of organizing the data

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Requirements for Classification System

- Flexible
  - Scheme must serve different needs, environments and systems
- Extensible
  - New systems have new vulnerabilities and may introduce new classes of vulnerabilities
  - New systems have old vulnerabilities arising in new ways
- Useful
  - Easy to look up vulnerabilities based on criteria not known to the designers
  - Easy to find similar vulnerabilities, again where the metric for “similar” is not known to the designers

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My Definitions

- Partition states into *authorized* and *unauthorized*
- *vulnerable state*: authorized state from which an unauthorized state can be reached
- *compromised state*: state so reached
- *attack*: sequence of authorized state transitions ending in a compronised state
- *vulnerability*: characterization of a vulnerable state distinguishing it from all non-vulnerable states

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Approach

- Decompose vulnerability into characteristics
  - want a minimal set, *ie.*, if any of the characteristics are false, you don't have a vulnerability
- Characteristics may be at any level of abstraction and from any point of view
  - more on this later

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Example: *fingerd* Flaw

- Input from user put onto stack without bounds checking
- If input too long, overwrites PSW and return address
- So … load your favorite machine code into the buffer, and overflow, setting return address to address of buffer

Characteristics:

PD6, failure to validate type of object (input)

PI3: failure to check array or buffer bounds

E5: improper entered data

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Example: *ypupdated* Flaw

- Authenticate remote use as root using Diffie-Hellman with 133-bit private key
- If no *root* key, assume remote user is generic *nobody* and use that key (preconfigured, well known)
- Authentication succeeds for *nobody*, but no indication it was the *nobody* user (so actions proceed for *root*)

Characteristics:

PD2: improper setting of programming defaults

PI5: improper choice of operand

Level of Abstraction

Absorbed into characteristics

- if design flaw, use design-oriented characteristics
- if implementation flaw, use implementation-oriented characteristics
- notion of containment: if $A \subseteq B$, then B is a refinement of A, or A is "more generic" than B

Point of View

A qualifier to characteristics
- process(es) being attacked
- process(es) doing the attacking
- operating system
- possibly others?

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Example: *fingerd*

- *fingerd* process
  - PD6, PI3, E5 (seen before)
- attacking process
  - PI5, improper choice of operand (input too long)
  - E5, improper entered data (input; it's too long)
- operating system
  - PI9, unauthorized acess to a portion of memory (writing to what should be protected, the return address and PSW)
  - PI1, TOCTTOU flaw (return address changes between storage and use)
  - E6, improper object permissions (can execute data)

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Performing the Classification

- Problem: terms **not** canonical
  - Highly unlikely we'll ever get a universally agreed-upon vocabulary for these
  - Relationship of terms may not be clear to a developer who is not an expert in the nature of vulnerabilities (or knows very little about security!)
- Answer: create a thesaurus
  - Organizes terms to enable classifier or user to find related terms quickly
  - Independent of organization of data

Approach suggested by Mike Raugh of Interconnect Technologies; work done with him and Diane Hillmann of the Technical Support Services, Olin Library, Cornell University and a member of Machine-Readable Bibliographic Information Committee of the American Library Association

Example Page from VCS Thesaurus

Program: Implementation
- TOCTTOU style flaws
  - UF Time of check to time of use style flaws
  - UF Flaws, TOCTTOU
  - UF Improper change
  - UF Improper deletion
  - NT Interprocess communication
  - NT File accesses
- File accesses
  - UF Accesses, File
  - BT TOCTTOU style flaws
  - RT Interprocess communication

(Example Page con't)

interprocess communication
- UF Communication, Interprocess
- BT TOCTTOU style flaws
- NT access open
- NT stat open
- RT File accesses

access open
- UF access followed by open
- BT Interprocess communication
- RT stat open

stat open
- UF stat followed by open
- UF status open
- BT Interprocess communication
- RT access open

Comparison to Other Taxomonies

- PA, RISOS
  - these had very generic categories
  - as used, seemed to put all flaws into exactly one class (although no reason flaws could not be in multiple classes)
  - point of view, level of abstraction ignored
- Aslam
  - specific to flaws in UNIX systems and C programs, so everything at implementation level
  - decision procedure put flaws into exactly one class, thereby obscured nature of flaws with multiple characteristics
- Landwehr
  - built on PA

Future Directions

- Build a thesaurus
- Acquire network infrastructure systems (routers, *etc.*)
- Extend security checking tool *slint* to look for other vulnerabilities
  - Currently does race conditions, type checking
- Automated methods for including data into vulnerabilities database
- Focus on forensics of attack tools
- Obtain more systems, especially older systems, to help build historical record

Sponsors

- United States Air Force
  - Work on the taxonomy, database, tool building
- NIST (work in conjunction with Interconnect Technologies, Inc.)
  - Work on the digital library aspects of the database, especially the thesaurus and the representation of data
- SRI International
  - Work on some aspects of the database